arXiv:2505.18277v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Though humans seem to be remarkable learners, arguments in cognitive science and philosophy of mind have long maintained that learning something fundamentally new is impossible. Specifically, Jerry Fodor’s arguments for radical concept nativism hold that most, if not all, concepts are innate and that what many call concept learning never actually leads to the acquisition of new concepts. These arguments have deeply affected cognitive science, and many believe that the counterarguments to radical concept nativism have been either unsuccessful or only apply to a narrow class of concepts. This paper first reviews the features and limitations of prior arguments. We then identify three critical points – related to issues of expressive power, conceptual structure, and concept possession – at which the arguments in favor of radical concept nativism diverge from describing actual human cognition. We use ideas from computer science and information theory to formalize the relevant ideas in ways that are arguably more scientifically productive. We conclude that, as a result, there is an important sense in which people do indeed learn new concepts.
Expert Commentary: Revisiting Radical Concept Nativism
As a cognitive science expert, I find the debate surrounding radical concept nativism to be a fascinating topic that delves into the very nature of human cognition. The notion that humans may not be capable of learning fundamentally new concepts challenges traditional views about the nature of learning and intelligence.
The arguments put forth by Jerry Fodor have sparked considerable discussion in the field, shaping our understanding of how innate certain concepts may be. However, the assertion that most concepts are innate and that concept learning does not genuinely result in the acquisition of new concepts raises important questions about the nature of human cognition.
One of the key strengths of this paper is its multidisciplinary approach, drawing insights from computer science and information theory to shed new light on the debate. By formalizing the concepts in a more scientific manner, the authors provide a fresh perspective on the issues of expressive power, conceptual structure, and concept possession.
By bridging the gap between cognitive science, philosophy of mind, computer science, and information theory, this paper highlights the complexity of human cognition and the interdisciplinary nature of understanding concepts. It challenges us to rethink traditional assumptions about how we acquire new knowledge and concepts, suggesting that there may be more to learning than we previously thought.
In conclusion, this paper opens up exciting avenues for further research, offering a nuanced understanding of how humans learn and acquire new concepts. By bringing together insights from various disciplines, it deepens our appreciation for the intricacies of human cognition and the ways in which we make sense of the world around us.